Several people who received the CrowdStrike offer found that the gift card didn't work, while others got an error saying the voucher had been canceled.
Why would you want another year of their software for free? This is their second screw up (apparently they sent out a bad update that affected some Debian and RHEL machines a couple years ago). I’d be transitioning to a competitor at the first opportunity. It seems they aren’t testing releases before pushing them out to customers, which is about as crazy to me as running alpha software on a production system.
I’m sure you have reasons, and this isn’t really meant to be directed at you personally, it’s just boggling to me that the IT sector as a whole hasn’t looked at this situation and collectively said “fuck that.”
Why would you want another year of their software for free?
Because AV, like everything else, costs a fortune at enterprise scale.
And yeah, I do understand your real point, but it’s really hard to choose good software. Every purchasing decision is a gamble and pretty much every time you choose something it’ll go bad sooner or later. (We didn’t imagine Vmware would turn into an extortion racket, for example. And we were only saying a few months ago how good value and reliable PRTG was, and they’ve just quadrupled their costs)
It doesn’t matter how much due diligence and testing you put into software, it’s really hard to choose good stuff. Crowdstrike was the choice a year ago (the Linux thing was more recent than that), and its detection methods remain world class. Do we trust it? Hell no, but if we change to something else, there are risks and costs to that too.
Maybe AV, at an enterprise scale, is actually a horrible idea that reduces security, availability, and reliability and should be abolished through policy.
Tbh the RHEL/Debian bug only occurred because of bugs in Debian and RHEL, they couldn’t really do much about those. Especially the Debian one, which only took place in Linux kernels several versions above the normal Debian kernel.
CrowdStrike releasing a buggy release can just happen sometimes. I just hope the entire industry may condider that relying on three or four vendors for auto-updating software installed all corporate computers in the world may not be a good idea.
This whole thing could’ve been malicious. We got lucky now that it only crashed these systems, just imagine the damage you can do if you hack CrowdStrike themselves and push out a cryptolocker.
Not just Crowdstrike - any vendor that does automatic updates, which is more and more each day. Microsoft too big for a bad actor to do as you describe? Nope. Anything relying on free software? Supply chain vulnerabilities are huge and well documented - its only a matter of time.
The automatic update part was akin to virus definitions and triggered a bug in code released long before that. Not auto-updating your antivirus software would put a pretty high tax on the IT team as those updates can get released multiple times a day (and during weekends). I agree on not auto updating text editors and such, but there are types of software that need updates quickly and often.
Supply chain attacks can always work, but this shows how ill-prepared companies are for their systems failing on a scale like this. The fix itself is maybe a minute or two per device if you use Microsoft’s dedicated repair tool, maybe even less if you use that thing with PXE boot, but we’re still weeks away from fixing the damage everywhere.
Nah, I don’t buy that. When you’re in critical infrastructure like that it’s your job to anticipate things like people being above or below versions. This isn’t the latest version of flappy bird, this is kernel level code that needs to be space station level accurate, that they’re pushing remotely to massive amounts of critical infrastructure.
I won’t say this was one guy, and I definitely don’t think it was malicious. This is just standard corporate software engineering, where deadlines are pushed to the max and QA is seen as an expense, not an investment. They’re learning the harsh realities of cutting QA processes right now, and I say good. There is zero reason a bit of this magnitude should have gone out. I mean, it was an empty file of zeroes. How did they not have any pipelines to check that file, code in the kernel itself to validate the file, or anyone put eyes on the file before pushing it.
This is a massive company wide fuckup they had, and it’s going to end up with them reporting to Congress and many, many courts on what happened.
Why would you want another year of their software for free? This is their second screw up (apparently they sent out a bad update that affected some Debian and RHEL machines a couple years ago). I’d be transitioning to a competitor at the first opportunity. It seems they aren’t testing releases before pushing them out to customers, which is about as crazy to me as running alpha software on a production system.
I’m sure you have reasons, and this isn’t really meant to be directed at you personally, it’s just boggling to me that the IT sector as a whole hasn’t looked at this situation and collectively said “fuck that.”
Because AV, like everything else, costs a fortune at enterprise scale.
And yeah, I do understand your real point, but it’s really hard to choose good software. Every purchasing decision is a gamble and pretty much every time you choose something it’ll go bad sooner or later. (We didn’t imagine Vmware would turn into an extortion racket, for example. And we were only saying a few months ago how good value and reliable PRTG was, and they’ve just quadrupled their costs)
It doesn’t matter how much due diligence and testing you put into software, it’s really hard to choose good stuff. Crowdstrike was the choice a year ago (the Linux thing was more recent than that), and its detection methods remain world class. Do we trust it? Hell no, but if we change to something else, there are risks and costs to that too.
Unfortunate reality for lot for medium to big size businesses.
Maybe AV, at an enterprise scale, is actually a horrible idea that reduces security, availability, and reliability and should be abolished through policy.
Tbh the RHEL/Debian bug only occurred because of bugs in Debian and RHEL, they couldn’t really do much about those. Especially the Debian one, which only took place in Linux kernels several versions above the normal Debian kernel.
CrowdStrike releasing a buggy release can just happen sometimes. I just hope the entire industry may condider that relying on three or four vendors for auto-updating software installed all corporate computers in the world may not be a good idea.
This whole thing could’ve been malicious. We got lucky now that it only crashed these systems, just imagine the damage you can do if you hack CrowdStrike themselves and push out a cryptolocker.
Not just Crowdstrike - any vendor that does automatic updates, which is more and more each day. Microsoft too big for a bad actor to do as you describe? Nope. Anything relying on free software? Supply chain vulnerabilities are huge and well documented - its only a matter of time.
The automatic update part was akin to virus definitions and triggered a bug in code released long before that. Not auto-updating your antivirus software would put a pretty high tax on the IT team as those updates can get released multiple times a day (and during weekends). I agree on not auto updating text editors and such, but there are types of software that need updates quickly and often.
Supply chain attacks can always work, but this shows how ill-prepared companies are for their systems failing on a scale like this. The fix itself is maybe a minute or two per device if you use Microsoft’s dedicated repair tool, maybe even less if you use that thing with PXE boot, but we’re still weeks away from fixing the damage everywhere.
Nah, I don’t buy that. When you’re in critical infrastructure like that it’s your job to anticipate things like people being above or below versions. This isn’t the latest version of flappy bird, this is kernel level code that needs to be space station level accurate, that they’re pushing remotely to massive amounts of critical infrastructure.
I won’t say this was one guy, and I definitely don’t think it was malicious. This is just standard corporate software engineering, where deadlines are pushed to the max and QA is seen as an expense, not an investment. They’re learning the harsh realities of cutting QA processes right now, and I say good. There is zero reason a bit of this magnitude should have gone out. I mean, it was an empty file of zeroes. How did they not have any pipelines to check that file, code in the kernel itself to validate the file, or anyone put eyes on the file before pushing it.
This is a massive company wide fuckup they had, and it’s going to end up with them reporting to Congress and many, many courts on what happened.